Stephensoh's approach is critical; ff he obviously came to admire and to cherish the memories of the men he writes about, he is rarely blind to their limitations.
at New Orleans ,than New Englanders, who went down on a special train. Indeed, Mr. Stephenson s subtitle is far from excessive. Although all of his historians worked in the 1890's and the first decade of the twentieth century, they were truly pioneers in a region which had to be cajoled, badgered, and scolded into preserving its records and systematizing its teaching and study of history in its colleges and universities. Significant, too, is the acknowledgment that Trent, Brown, and Bassett all left the South for a more congenial North, where opportunities were wider. Even U. B. Phillips deliberately chose not to return to his beloved Southland once he had studiedin the North. There is much, in short, in this volume on the intellectual history of the South.
The volume is also a study of the way in which history is written, both formally and informally. A delightful example of the latter is the banter that passed between Bassett and Dunning, who were close friends; it is as modern and as irreverent as any which now passes between contemporary scholars working for a common editor or faced with the eternal conflict between heavy teaching schedules and the desire (or necessity) to write.
For all his interest in the writing of history, Mr. Stephenson is obviously also a teacher of history. His didactic and admonitory asides to the younger members of the guild are sprinkled throughout the book, as well as appearing in more concentrated form in his long introduction. Some of his advice may seem a little old-fashioned, but none is offered in a pompous or superior tone; the craft of history is clearly a never-ending apprenticeship to him and he would like it to be that, too, for those who carry on where the pioneers left off. Lansing remained in office long after the futility of his position had become apparent, but by quiet, practical, tenacious, and varied approaches, he was able to influence the conduct of Far Eastern policy and, indeed, to present alternatives to Wilson's views. In brief, the thesis is that the realistic Lansing based his policy primarily on his concern for United States economic and commercial interests in China and, therefore, had a different order of priorities and different points of emphasis from the President. Lansing respected and perhaps feared Japan, he recognized the opportunities that had been presented toher by the European war, and thus he decided that a bargain was necessary. The compromise would make concessions to Japanese aspirations on the northeast Asian mainland, but would also safeguard United States interests. The bargain, however, evaporated and the result was the Lansing-Ishii agreement, which wrapped the problems in ambiguity.
The 
